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Educating the Masses:
Expanding Title VII to Include Sexual
Orientation in the Education Arena
"Next in importance to freedom and justice is popular education,
without which neither freedom nor justice can be permanently
maintained."-James A. Garfield (1831-1881), July 12, 1880
INTRODUCTION
Tommy Schroeder was a fifteen-year veteran schoolteacher in
Hamilton School District in Wisconsin when he began to teach sixth
grade at Templeton Middle School.'
At that time, he publicly
announced his homosexuality. 2 As a result of this, Schroeder was forced
to endure students accusing him of having AIDS, calling him "faggot" or
"queer," and painting graffiti in the school bathrooms describing in
detail the type of sexual actions the students believed he was performing3
and more, while these indignities were ignored by the school district.
Schroeder's story is an all too common one in this country. While this
nation very gradually becomes more open-minded to the equal treatment
of persons discriminated against because of their sexual orientation, the
courts have long adhered to legislation that is outdated and yields
problematic results for those injured, particularly educators.
Title VII established freedom from discrimination because of sex,
inter alia, in the workplace.4 The key prohibition against discrimination
1. Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 948-49.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000); see Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County,

480 U.S. 616, 628-29 (1987); Meritor Savs. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986). There are
other protections under the Constitution that provide protection from discrimination based on sex
and/or gender, and may, in some cases, extend to sexual orientation such as the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the First Amendment. See Clifford P. Hooker, Terminating
Teachers and Revoking Their Licensure for Conduct Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate, 96 EDUC. L.

REP. 1, 1, 12 (1995) (addressing the the Constitutional issues in the juxtaposition between the right
to privacy of a teacher and the school district's desire for their employees to have exemplary
conduct); Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Law in Providing Education: School Board Control Over
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based on sex states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
5
individual'srace, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....

The language of Title VII omits the words "sexual orientation," yet
states that an employer may not lawfully discriminate against any
individual because of sex. In 1964, the protection of the "because of...
sex,, 6 provision was ambiguous, and in the forty years since then, the
Supreme Court has attempted to provide some rules and guidelines to
interpret the provision.
Although some protections from same-sex harassment have been
recognized, "because of sex" discrimination is a limited concept. 7
Outside the sexual harassment sphere, private employers do not need to
fear legal repercussions for discrimination against homosexuals. 8 In
addition, while the Supreme Court has recognized that Title VII protects

Education and a Teacher's Right to Privacy, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 609, 609 (2004)
(discussing teachers' Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy in juxtaposition to school boards'
authority); Anthony E. Varona, Setting the Record Straight: The Effects of the Employment NonDiscriminationAct of 1997 on the First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights of Gay and Lesbian
Public Schoolteachers, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 25, 26, 49 (1998) (discussing the Constitutional
implications of broad anti-discrimination legislation encompassing gays and lesbians in schools);
Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Federal and State Constitutional Provisions as Prohibiting
Discriminationin Employment on the Basis of Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Sexual orientation or
Conduct, 96 A.L.R.5th 391 (2002) (surveying state and federal constitutional challenges against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). This is merely a brief survey, and is by no means
an exhaustive representation of the plethora of articles and other materials available on the
Constitutional questions.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000) (emphasis added).
6. Id.
7. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998); Rene v. MGM
305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane), modifying 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir.
Grand (Rene 11),
2001). These are cases that deal exclusively with sexual harassment, not the broader issue of sex
discrimination by employers in the workplace. Before Oncale, circuits were split on the same-sex
harassment question. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir.
1996) (same-sex harassment claims not actionable) rev'd by 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998); Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that same-sex harassment is actionable under
Title VII); Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding same-sex
harassment actionable where based on "sex"); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138,
141-42 (4th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing that same-sex harassment is only actionable where harasser is
gay) abrogatedby Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
8. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,643 (2000).
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workers from sex or gender stereotypes, 9 it has not expanded Title VII to
become a general prohibition against all sex-related discrimination.
The time has come for Title VII to be reexamined and expanded to
become a complete federal prohibition on sexual orientation
discrimination in the educational arena and beyond. As this article will
show, the cases that have interpreted Title VII's requirement that an
employer may not discriminate "because of sex" have enabled lower
courts to afford protections to workers that, while sensible, were
certainly not explicit in the language of the statute. 10 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has failed to accord the same implicit protection to
workers suffering discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Subsequently, the myriad of Supreme Court decisions has greatly
expanded the scope of Title VII. Despite the general expansion of the
scope of Title VII, the Court's refusal to likewise expand the statute to
ban sexual orientation discrimination has led to confusing results in the
federal courts of appeals, most notably the Ninth Circuit. Realizing the
inadequate protection given by Title VII, many states have been far more
responsive to the changes in the political and social climate of this
country in the past forty years and have granted homosexual workers
much needed protection from sexual orientation discrimination.
The Supreme Court's refusal to modernize its interpretation of Title
VII is perplexing because many of the Court's opinions have reflected
the desire that the workforce reflect the surrounding population."' This
desire has greatly changed the field of education, once an essentially
male-dominated field." However, there is another concern in the field
of education: that educators should serve the student clients and reflect
13
their population in certain characteristics.
There has been little to no protection under Title VII for victims of
sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace, while other similar

9. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. Usi Film
Prods., 541 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
10. See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
11. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1989).
12. See PAUL MONROE, FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM: A HISTORY

OF EDUCATION INTHE UNITED STATES 295 (197 1). Schools were staffed by male "masters," except
for the "dame school" and the summer and women's school. Id. at 120-21. The dame schools were
private or separate schools where women taught children the rudiments of education such as the
alphabet or basic reading skills, before they went to public schools. Id. at 127-28.
13. Contra Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307 (holding that the correct statistical population was the
qualified labor pool of teachers in the area, while the lower court relied on statistics of the local
student population to show disparate impact).
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types of discrimination have been banned.' 4 In the educational
environment, this has been a particular problem. Education is an area in
which there has been an especially strong fight for gay, lesbian, bisexual,
or transgender individuals to stay out of the classroom.' 5 Opponents
usually say that lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual ("LGBT")
educators are poor role models and do not provide the proper moral
infusion for American youth.16 While there is no place for an unskilled
or inadequate teacher, a homosexual teacher is certainly neither, simply
because of his or her sexual orientation, and his or her sexuality should
not give co-workers, administrators, or students an opportunity to
discriminate without repercussion. Title VII's protection of sex-based
discrimination should be expanded to include all employer
discrimination; this includes both the already recognized protection of
the heterosexual man with stereotypical gay features,7 as well as the man
discriminated against for his known homosexuality.1
Teachers provide an invaluable resource to this country and deserve
to be treated with the utmost respect, never derogation. Teachers should
be unafraid to publicly acknowledge their sexuality, and should be able
to serve as homosexual role models in today's supposedly more
progressive and democratic society. Currently, the faculty of public
schools does not accurately reflect the makeup of the student population
or the population at large with respect to race, ethnicity and sexual
orientation; it may not even reflect the population of qualified teachers.
The emphasis on teachers as role models should not be ignored, but
rather, the educator work force needs to provide role models for every
kind of student that walks through the schoolhouse door-including
8
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning students.'

14.

See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (holding

that sex-discrimination consisting of same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII); Rene II,
305 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir) (en banc) (holding that Title VII prohibits offensive physical sexual
conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive without regard to whether the perpetrator and victim
are of the same or different genders); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th
Cir. 2001) (holding that discrimination based on a stereotype that a man should have a virile rather
than effeminate appearance is barred by Title VII).
15. See Katherine M. Franke, Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1995) (particularly addressing

military academies).
16. See Michelle Eisenmenger, Chalk Talk: Sexual Orientation Discrimination:Teachers as
Positive Role Models for Tolerance, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 235, 236 (2002).
17. See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75; Rene 11, 305 F.3d at 1064.

18. See Eisenmenger, supra note 16, at 237. There are several examples of suits brought
representing student interests. See, e.g., Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of
Educ. of Boyd County, 258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 691 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (where the court granted a

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol25/iss1/12

4

EDUCA
TING THE
2007] and Zwerin: Educating
MASSES Title VII to Include Sexual Orien
Hatami
the Masses:
Expanding

Section I gives a brief history of Title VII, and the landmark
Supreme Court cases in the past forty years that have refined the Court's
interpretation of "sex" discrimination.
Section II examines the
subsequent treatment of Title VII in the federal courts of appeals,
specifically the inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit between Rene v. MGM
Grand,19 and Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises.20 These two
cases provide a shocking example of how the line between gender
stereotyping and sexual orientation discrimination has become so thin
that the distinction is confusing, unworkable, and must be wholly
abandoned. Section III, in turn, shows how states enacting legislation
banning sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace have avoided
such results. This section will further examine these states' rationale for
taking the necessary step that the federal government has not. Section
IV focuses on the inconsistency between the founding and purpose of
public schools, the development of educational theories to denigrate
sexism and applaud the characteristics of the individual, and also
examines the specific problem of educators suffering from sexual
orientation discrimination, unable to bring a proper claim under Title
VII. Finally, Section V closely examines the key language of Title VII,
specifically the purpose of Title VII to codify constitutional protections
in the "because of sex" provision. In conclusion, after evaluating
important circuit court decisions and the foundation and purposes of
both Title VII and modem education, the authors argue that the statute,
designed in part to protect Constitutional rights in public education, has
been improperly interpreted by the federal courts and needs to be
reexamined and expanded to include sexual orientation discrimination
under the "because of sex" language, in order to protect the fundamental
rights of all citizens.

preliminary injunction to a gay rights group that demanded equal access to school facilities, under
the Equal Access Act and the First Amendment, as were given to other student groups); Massey v.
Banning Unified Sch. Dist., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (plaintiff sued a school
district for violating her civil rights when they suspended her from gym class after finding out that
she was a lesbian).
19. (Rene 11) 305 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (en bane), modifying 243 F.3d 1206 (9th
Cir. 2001).
20. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
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I.

HISTORY OF TITLE VII

A. Enactment of Title VII
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for an
employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."21
Admittedly, Title VII was not passed with "sex" discrimination as its
primary concern, but rather, as a response to the civil rights movement;
its design was mainly to protect African Americans and other racial
minorities from discrimination in the workplace.22 In fact, Howard
Smith, a Representative from Virginia, proposed the inclusion of "sex"
as a protection because he thought this would lead to the failure of the
bill.23 However, the bill passed in the House and Senate,24 with little
debate over the interpretation of "because of sex." 25 As a result, the
courts have little legislative history to rely upon in its Title VII
jurisprudence. 26 Nevertheless, Title VII has become this country's
primary federal anti-discrimination legislation over the past forty years.27
B. The Supreme CourtExpands "Because of Sex" Requirement
Since Title VII was first enacted in 1964, the Supreme Court's
conception of "sex" discrimination, under the "because of sex"
provision, has continuously expanded. "Sex" was originally understood
to mean discrimination requiring actual sexual advances upon the
affected party.28 Later, the Court modified "because of sex" to prohibit
discrimination against a person because of his or her gender, or more
specifically, whether she or he does or does not fit certain gender
stereotypes. 29 Recently, the Court clarified the "because of sex"

21.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).

22. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2577-2584 (1964).
23. Kristin M. Bovalino, Note, How the Effeminate Male Can Maximize His Odds of Winning
Title VII Litigation, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117, 1123 (2003).
24. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
25. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
26. Bovalino, supra note 23, at 1123.
27. See id.
28. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
29. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 257-58 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. Usi
Film Prods., 541 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
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requirement to show that3° Title VII encompasses violations between
members of the same sex.
The first major interpretation of the "because of sex" requirement31
by the Supreme Court came in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.
In Meritor, the respondent claimed that the petitioner bank had subjected
her to constant sexual discrimination in her employment, violating Title
VII. 32 The petitioner conceded that were its harassment because of the
subordinate's sex or gender, such behavior would constitute a Title VII
violation, 33 but it contended that based upon the existing Title VII cases
and existing legislative history of Title VII, Congress only intended to
apply the "because of sex" requirement to "tangible loss of an economic
character," rather than "purely psychological aspects of the workplace
The Supreme Court rejected the employer's
environment." 34
interpretation of Title VII, holding that Congress did not intend to limit
sexual harassment claims to those of a tangible economic nature, but to
those where the harassment was so pervasive as to create a "hostile work
environment." 35 Consistent with the decisions to follow, Meritor was
decided not upon any concrete language that established a hostile work
environment claim in Title VII, but upon past constructions and a sparse
record of legislative intent.36
The next decision by the Supreme Court to greatly expand the
"because of sex" interpretation was Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.37 The
respondent, Anne Hopkins, charged the petitioner accounting firm, her
employer, with failing to reconsider her for a partnership solely based
upon her sex as a woman.38 In Hopkins' case, she was praised for being
an aggressive, intelligent, and capable professional. 39 However,
Hopkins was derided for not "walk[ing] more femininely, talk[ing]
more femininely, dress[ing] more femininely, wear[ing] make-up,
hav[ing] her hair styled, and wear[ing] jewelry."4 ° She was also

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
166, 105
38.
39.
40.

See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
at 60.
See id.
at64.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 64-65.
at 65.
See id.
490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgrafv. Usi Film Prods., 541 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
See id.at 234.
Id.at235.
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criticized for being "a lady [who] us[ed] foul language."' 1 The Supreme
Court expanded its interpretation of discrimination "because of sex" to
prohibit discrimination against a woman not only because she was a
woman generally, but because of her failure to conform to gender
stereotypes requiring an individual to possess or lack certain
stereotypical traits, whether they be male or female.42
In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan wrote for the court, "[a]n
employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions
require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
catch-22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they
do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind., 43 As was the case with
the decision in Meritor, to expand Title VII to protect against a "hostile
work environment," the decision in Price Waterhouse, that Title VII's
"because of sex" discrimination was intended to bar gender or sex
stereotyping, has no explicit foundation in the language of Title VII.
Few commentators argue that Price Waterhouse, as a plurality
opinion, does not extend to sex-stereotyping.4 4 However, most scholars
and courts cite Price Waterhouse as extending protections based on sex
to prohibit the most invidious types of sex discrimination, sexual
stereotyping, or discrimination against an individual because she or he
does not fit the traditional "feminine" or "masculine" model of gender
expression.4 5 As Title VII litigation has progressed, some commentators
have urged an expansion of "because of . . .sex" to include sexual
orientation, not just gender.46
More recently, the Supreme Court made the next logical extension
of Title VII's "because of sex" clause when a male claimant alleged
sexual harassment under the statute. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., the petitioner, Joseph Oncale, claimed that he voluntarily
41.

Id.

42. See id.at250.
43. Id.at 251.
44. See, e.g., Robert A. Kearney, The Unintended Hostile Environment: Mapping the Limits
of Sexual Harassment Law, 25 BERKELEY J.EMP. & LAB. L. 87, 113-14 (2004); James Leonard,
Bilingualism and Equity: Title VII Claims for Language Discriminationin the Workplace, 38 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 86 (2004); Phillip McGough, Same-Sex Harassment: Do Either Price
Waterhouse or Oncale Support the Ninth Circuit's Holding in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant
Enterprises, Inc. that Same-Sex HarassmentBased on Failure to Conform to Gender Stereotypes is
Actionable?, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 206, 207 (2004).

45. See, e.g., Jonathan A. Hardage, Comment, Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.
and the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Does Title VII Prohibit "Effeminacy"
Discrimination?, 54 ALA. L. REv. 193, 193-94 (2002) (discussing the expansion of "gender

stereotype" discrimination).
46.

Id.
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left his job feeling that if he did not he would be "raped or forced to have
sex" with two male coworkers. 47 Although the Supreme Court had
never before ruled for a male claimant asserting a Title VII violation, it
readily extended the doctrine to apply to both genders. 48 In a unanimous
opinion by Justice Scalia, the court stated that there was "no justification
in the statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule" against
same-sex harassment suits under Title VII. 49 The court specified that the
prohibition of "discrimination . . . because of sex" raises the issue of
"whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are
not .... 50
Before this decision, the federal courts of appeals took a confusing
and inconsistent variety of stances regarding same-sex Title VII
violations. Some asserted that a Title VII claim is never supported in
instances of same-sex harassment.5' Others required that the harasser be
homosexual and then presumptively motivated by sexual desire. 52 The
Supreme Court cleared up this confusion by holding the important issue
in a Title VII claim is not whether the parties are the same sex, or
opposite sexes, or if the party discriminated against was a woman, but
whether "members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions53of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed.,

Consistent with Meritor and Price Waterhouse before it, Oncale is
another logical extension of Title VII, providing a remedy that was
clearly not established by the plain language of the statute. However,
despite the Supreme Court's willingness to broaden the coverage in Title
VII over the past forty years, the Supreme Court has failed to accord the
same protection and expansionary treatment to claims of sexual
orientation discrimination under Title VII.

47.

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1996).

48. See id. at 79.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
51. See, e.g., Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
52. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.5 (4th

Cir. 1996) (dictum), abrogated by Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79-80.
53. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (emphasis added).
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C. Lawrence v. Texas Greatly Increases the FundamentalRights of
Homosexuals.
This subsection examines the evolution of Title VII in protecting
the rights of homosexuals to engage in private, intimate sexual acts.
Although these cases were not in the employment context and not
decided under Title VII, the core principles at issue, such as a
fundamental right to exist in peace, strongly relate to the core values of
Title VII. As such, an analysis of these cases and their potential impact
on Title VII in the future is necessary.
Until 2003, homosexual couples did not have the right to engage in
sodomy in the privacy of their home.54 The Supreme Court first
addressed the issue of privacy for gay couples in Bowers v. Hardwick,55
when the Court was faced with a facial challenge to a Georgia statute
prohibiting the act of sodomy.56 A person violating the state law could
be imprisoned for up to twenty years. 57 In a 5-4 decision, Justice White
wrote for the majority, explaining that the Court was called upon to
decide whether the Constitution protects the right to engage in
homosexual sodomy as a fundamental right.58 In the Court's opinion it
did not.59
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens authored the seminal dissent in Bowers.6 ° Justice Blackmun
recognized that the majority had fundamentally misunderstood the issue
of Bowers. 61 Addressing the case in terms of "decisional" and "spatial"
rights to privacy long recognized by the Constitution, the dissent noted
that "the concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a person
belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole."' 62 Justice
Stevens, in a separate dissent, came to the following conclusion:
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187.
Id. at 188.
Seeid. at 190.

59.

Justice White and the Bowers majority examined the history of homosexual sodomy laws.

Id. at 193. At common law, sodomy was illegal in all thirteen of the original colonies, and after the
Civil War, 32 of 37 existing states had laws prohibiting homosexual sodomy. Id. at 193 n.5.
Against this historical backdrop, the majority concluded that homosexual sodomy could not be a
right "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" and was not protected by the
Constitution. Id. at 192-194.
60. Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. "[T]his case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by

civilized men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone."' Id.
62.

Id. at 204.
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Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice. . . . Second, individual decisions by
married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form
of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by
unmarried as well as married persons.63
The dissent keenly recognized that homosexuals, like all private
citizens in America, have a fundamental right to privacy and to exist as
autonomous persons, free from unnecessary invasion from society. This
recognition was a critical step toward a later reversal of the majority
ruling. The fundamental right of a homosexual to live in this country as
his or her own person is an essential notion warranting a reexamination
of Title VII.
In 2003, Lawrence v. Texas 64 reversed Bowers, ending a seventeen
year span in which homosexuals were denied one of their most
fundamental liberties-the right to engage in sex with another person of
the same gender in the privacy of the home.65 The Supreme Court
recognized that Bowers had been based on long-standing historical and
religious Judeo-Christian moral values, but showed that cases to follow
and the evolution of more liberal stances toward homosexuality had
rendered it outdated law. 66 The majority relied heavily on the Bowers
dissent authored by Justice Stevens,67 and held that the Texas statute was
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
Less than two years after the decision, Lawrence's impact on the
sexual discrimination law is as of yet unclear. Lawrence was not a Title
VII decision; although phrased in the language of due process, the
decision may have been based on equal protection concerns. 68

63.

Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

64.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

65. See id. at 578.
66. See id. at 573.
67. Justice Kennedy noted that Justice Steven's analysis should have controlled in Bowers
and "should control here." Id. at 578.
68. Lawrence reads like an equal protection decision disguised in the language of due process,
but with the inherent concern to grant equal protection, regarding privacy rights, as have been
bestowed on heterosexuals, so that homosexuals may live in a society with their dignity and
personal autonomy intact. See Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off The
Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 564 (2004).
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Nonetheless, with the current absence of legislation that formally
prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, it is possible that Lawrence
could be a "tipping point" toward a better judicial understanding of the
rights of homosexuals.69
Following Lawrence, Title VII faces an uncertain future. The
Lawrence Court was prepared to overrule statutes criminalizing
homosexual conduct, even though the Court did not go so far as to
include homosexuals under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Lawrence gave reason to hope that its
protection of homosexual behavior could influence Title VII litigation.
However, the composition of the Court changed radically in 2005; Chief
Justice Rehnquist passed away and Justice O'Connor retired. Justices
Roberts and Alito respectively replaced them. Both justices were
recommended by President Bush and are expected to take conservative
approaches to issues such as homosexuality. Although the Supreme
Court and Congress have slowly showed signs of moving away from
rigid stances that denied homosexuals fundamental rights, it remains to
be seen whether Title VII will be amended in the coming years so that
Schroeder70 and all his colleagues can obtain the remedies that they are
currently denied under the Title VII jurisprudence.
II. THE CIRCUIT COURTS AGREE THERE Is No SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION CLAIM UNDER TITLE VII, BUT REMAIN CONFUSED
WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE BETWEEN THIS AND OTHER RECOGNIZED
CLAIMS

A. Background to the Lower Courts' Response
The Supreme Court has never decided the specific question of
whether a claim of harassment against an individual based upon that
person's sexual orientation is automatically cognizable under Title VII's
"because of sex" requirement. In Oncale, the Supreme Court, faced with

69. See Nan D. Hunter, Federal Courts, State Courts and Civil Rights: Judicial Power and
Politics Review of Daniel R. Pinello, Gay Rights and American Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 941, 979 (2004)

(observing that the Supreme Court only engages in transformations of reverses of legal discourse
only after a tipping point in the political climate has occurred). The tipping point may have come in
this country as a flurry of state supreme court rulings in recent years have overwhelmingly
overturned sodomy laws, longstanding in this country, and most likely signal a marked change in
this country's perception of gay rights, and the correct time for the advent of a federal statute like
Title VII, that will ban sexual orientation discrimination. See id.
70. See supranote I and accompanying text.
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an opportunity to address the possibility of a cause of action under Title
VII for sexual orientation-based harassment,71 sidestepped the issue,
perhaps because the petitioner, not wishing to publicly be classified as a
homosexual, instead asserted only that he had suffered discrimination
under Title VII because the statute protects victims of same-sex
harassment. 2
The Supreme Court has remained silent on the
actionability of a claim based upon an individual's sexual orientation
under Title VII. Most courts, recognizing that the Supreme Court has
not reversed a Circuit decision rejecting sexual orientation as a protected
class, continue
to reject claims of harassment based on sexual
73
orientation.
Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co. 74 provides a good
illustration of how the several courts of appeals treat Title VII claims
based solely on sexual orientation. In Bibby, the petitioner's energy
level was significantly decreased following a period of hospitalization
for a severe illness, however, defendant accused him of sleeping on the
job. Seeking to remove petitioner from his employ one way or the other,
defendant offered him a deal by which he would receive $5,000 and
benefits if he were to resign, otherwise he would be terminated and
receive nothing.75 Bibby also claimed that he was verbally insulted by
his co-workers, and that he was mistreated and yelled at by supervisors
because of his sexual orientation.76 Bibby brought suit,
claiming that he
77
had been sexually harassed in violation of Title VII.

71. During his brief employment with Sundowner, Oncale was the victim of constant sexually
abusive conduct by his supervisors Danny Pippen, John Lyons, and Brandon Johnson, including the
following incidents: Pippen grabbed and held Oncale's head as Lyon's told Oncale he would fuck
him in the behind; the next morning Johnson grabbed Oncale's while Lyons placed his penis on
Oncale's arm and told him they would force him to submit; in the shower later that day, Pippen
cornered Oncale while Lyons inserted a bar of soap into Oncale's rear. Brief for Petitioner at n.2,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1997) (No. 96-568).
72. Oncale contended that his argument did not rely upon an automatic extension of Title VII
to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, but that the Supreme Court could find a
violation of Title VII if he established "the existence of an unlawful hostile work environment, for
example, by showing that the harassment of a sexual nature occurred, or that respondent Sundowner
would have accorded a greater degree of protection to a woman complaining about such
harassment." Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 97-568).
73. See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003);
Rene I1, 305 F.3d 1061, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996)
abrogatedby Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
74. 260 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 2001).
75. Id. at 259.
76. Id. at 260.
77. Id.
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The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the claims against the
employer, citing the opinion of several circuits that Title VII did not
apply to claims of sexual orientation discrimination.7 s The court
implicitly assumed that sexual orientation is not "because of sex"
although the Supreme Court has never so specifically held. 79 Bibby
based this assumption on the fact that in recent years Congress has been
unsuccessful in several efforts to amend Title VII to include sexual
orientation discrimination.80 The court concluded that in order to state a
Title VII claim upon which relief could be granted, Bibby would have to
show either that he endured same-sex harassment based upon his
harasser's sexual desires, or that he was improperly sexually stereotyped
based upon his male gender.81
In the Sixth Circuit, a male with gender identity disorder can
establish a prima facie case for sex discrimination under Title VII. 82 In
Smith v. City of Salem,s3 the court held that the employee in question, a
man with gender identity disorder who worked for a fire department for
seven years without incident until his diagnosis, made valid claims under
Title VII for sex stereotyping and adverse employment action. 84 The
court criticized the district court's reliance on pre-Price Waterhouse
cases to decide against Smith.85 It then established its grounds for
equaling Title VII's "sex" language with gender, and delineated the
precise meaning of treating someone differently on the basis of sex as:
[A]n employer who discriminates against women because, for
instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex
discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the
victim's sex. It follows that employers who discriminate against men
because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely,
are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination
would not occur but for the victim's sex.86
This logical construction of Title VII leaves open the door to

78. Id.at261.
79. See id.
80. Id. (citing Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996, S.2056, 104th Cong. (1996);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1995, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995); Employment NonDiscrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994)).
81. Id. at 262-63.
82. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2004).
83. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).

84. Id. at 570.
85. Id. at 573.
86. Id. at 572.
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recognizing causes of action against employers discriminating against
men who like men, as discrimination on the basis of sex because such
men are treated differently from female employees who have
relationships with men. If the purpose of Title VII is to eradicate sex
discrimination, in all of its forms, and sex discrimination includes sex
stereotypes, then Title VII should also prohibit discrimination based on
sexual preference.
This conclusion is only logical since such
discrimination is rooted in the failure of an individual to meet the sex
stereotypes of the heterosexual majority.
Basing the "because of sex" requirement upon gender becomes
increasingly unworkable when claims are filed by transsexuals. Courts
have been unable to uniformly define the gender of transsexuals and
have broken their gender into three categories:
(1) cases that consider sex to be immutably fixed at birth as either male
or female; (2) cases that consider sex to be either male or female but
not necessarily fixed at birth; and (3) cases that place transsexuals
outside of the categories male and female and thus outside of sex
entirely. 87
This variation among judicial decisions is equally as illustrative of
the difficulty that the courts have had in drawing distinct, bright-line
boundaries with sex discrimination in general. Just as the legal
definitions of transsexuals are changing, the legal definitions of sex are
changing. Therefore, these definitions should include sexual orientation,
especially since in many cases,
transsexuality may be a part of sexual
88
identification and orientation.
The Second Circuit has rejected sexual orientation as a gender norm
under Title VII because not all homosexual men are feminine, and not
all heterosexual men are masculine.8 9 In Simonton v. Runyon, 90 the court
considered the question of sexual harassment focused on the target
individual's homosexuality. 9'
The court called the behavior of
87. See Rebecca J. Moskow, Broader Legal Implications of Transsexual Sex Determination
Cases, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1421, 1422 (2003).
88.
Sonya K. Parrish, The Plight of Same-Sex Harassment Victims Under Title VII: Why
Sexual Orientation Discrimination Should Be Recognized as a Form of Sex Stereotyping, 4 NEV. L.
J. 471,479 (2004).
89. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).
90. 232 F.3d 33.

91. Id. at 35. The conduct complained of included comments such as "'go fuck yourself, fag,'
'suck my dick,' and 'so you like it up the ass?,"' notes in the employee bathroom, posting of explicit
pornography, "Playgirl" subscriptions, "posters stating that Simonton suffered from mental illness
as a result of 'bung hole disorder,' . . . [and] repeated statements that Simonton was a 'fucking
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Simonton's co-workers "morally reprehensible," but relied on the
traditional rule that the role of the judiciary is to interpret statutes
according to Supreme Court precedent, not according to how it believes
the law should be. 92 The court stated that "[t]he law is well-settled in
this circuit and in all others to have reached the question that Simonton
has no cause of action under Title VII because Title VII does 93not
prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation.,
However, the court still found it important to look at the legislative
history of Title VII as a guide. 94 The court noted that there was little in
the way of legislative history, and that Congressional silence does not
always provide a guide to statutory interpretation. 95 Nonetheless, the
court interpreted Congress' failure to amend Title VII as instructive,
especially in light of many court decisions construing the "because of
96
sex" language in Title VII to exclude sexual orientation discrimination.
The court also relied on its prior decision in DeCintio v. Westchester
County Medical Center,97 where it held that "sex" "'logically could only
refer to membership in a class delineated by gender, rather than sexual
activity regardless of gender."' 98 This case failed to recognize that such
an interpretation of sex and gender, or sexual activity as a result of
gender expression, creates a double standard and reinforces normative
stereotypes of heterosexual gender expression.
The Second Circuit threw out all three of Simonton's arguments
that sexual orientation discrimination should fall under "sex" in Title
VII. 99 First, the court refused to evaluate Simonton's claim that his
harassers singled him out because he was male because he did not offer
comparative evidence regarding the treatment of other male coworkers. 00 Therefore, the court concluded that the conduct could just as
well have been directed at a female.'°' Second, it declined to find that
"sexual orientation is discrimination based on sex because it
disproportionately affects men," as Simonton suggested, determining
that this would be an unwarranted judicial foray into the legislative

faggot."' Id.
92. Id. (citing Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999)).

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 35-36.
97.
98.

807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986).
Simonton, 232 F.3d at 36 (quoting DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306-07).

99. Id.
100. Id. at37.
101.

Id.
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arena. 102
Lastly, the court struck down Simonton's third argument, not on the
merits of the argument, but for insufficient pleading. 103 Simonton
argued, based on Price Waterhouse, that he suffered actionable sex
discrimination because sexual orientation discrimination is based on sex
stereotypes. 104 The court noted that other courts have mentioned that
"failure to conform to gender norms" might be capable of recognition
under Title VII,105 but even so, the sexual stereotype theory creates a
protection that would not only cover sexual orientation, but rather a
protection that bleeds over to cover those whom, regardless of sexual
orientation, do not fit traditional gender stereotypes. 10 6 The court
reserved its opinion on the impact of Price Waterhouse on sexual
orientation discrimination to "a future case in which [it] is squarely
presented and sufficiently pled." 10 7 Unfortunately for Simonton, and for
the proponents of the expansion of Title VII's "because of sex"
requirement to incorporate sexual orientation, insufficient pleading may
have derailed the expansion of this protection.
The cases cited in this section demonstrate that lower courts are
interpreting the "because of sex" clause inconsistently from each other.
While the Third Circuit adopts a narrow interpretation that no claim with
relation to sexual orientation may be recognized under Title VII, other
courts such as the Sixth Circuit have seemingly more liberal
interpretations, at least allowing claims by trans-gendered individuals.
However, while these courts are externally at odds with each other, a
larger fundamental problem has arisen in the Ninth Circuit, where two
recent cases have established holdings that are inconsistent with each
other, and are improperly derived from Supreme Court precedent.
B. Inconsistency between Rene and Nichols in the Ninth Circuit
This section of the note closely examines two recent cases in the
Ninth Circuit, the only two cases yet decided that attempt to identify a
102. Id. This argument, if accepted, could lead in two directions. First, it could open the door
to recognition of sexual orientation discrimination against males as having a disproportionate effect
on males, specifically gay males. Second, however, it could shut the door to claims of sex
discrimination for females or persons of transgender identity if they are unable to show a tangible
disproportionate impact.
103. Id. at 37-38.
104. Id. at 37.
105. Id. (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000)).
106. Id. at38.
107. Id. at 37.
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boundary between sexual stereotyping and sexual orientation
discrimination.108 The analysis of these cases will show that as a result
of the inability of the courts to distinguish these two lines of cases
effectively, Title VII must be expanded to incorporate sexual orientation
discrimination to avoid inconsistent and illogical results.
Medina Rene, an openly homosexual man, was employed by the
MGM Grand Hotel as a butler on the twenty-ninth floor of the hotel,
catering to very high-profile and wealthy guests.10 9 Rene was subject to
pervasive abuse by his all-male coworkers, significant enough to
constitute a hostile work environment violation under Title VII.L" His
superiors failed to respond to his complaints against his coworkers. 1
Rene brought suit against MGM Grand for a violation of Title VII,
alleging unlawful sexual harassment. The district court dismissed
Rene's claim, reasoning that Rene's sole claim was that he was a victim
of sexual orientation discrimination, not prohibited by Title VII. "2
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case twice, including
an en banc rehearing. 1 3 The first panel dismissed Rene's claim because
it overlooked the Oncale requirement for physical sexual abuse and
narrowly focused on Title VII's denial of discrimination based on sexual
orientation. 4 The court later concluded en banc that Oncale "forbids
severe or pervasive same-sex sexual touching," and that Title VII
prohibits offensive touching, 1 5 a requirement that is found nowhere in
the text of Oncale. Furthermore, Rene's requirement of "physical
conduct of a sexual nature" is directly inconsistent with Nichols v.
Azteca Rest. Enterprises, Inc., 116in which a man who was the target of
slurs regarding his sexuality, yet suffering no physical or sexual abuse,
was found to have shown an actionable claim of "because of sex"

108.
109.
110.

See Parrish, supra note 88, at 472.
Rene v. MGM Grand (Rene 1), 243 F.3d 1206, 1207 (9th Cir. 2001).
See id.

The sexual harassment consisted of, among other things, being grabbed in the crotch
and poked in the anus on numerous occasions, being forced to look at pictures of naked
men having sex while his co-workers looked on and laughed, being caressed, hugged,

whistled and blown kisses at, and being called "sweetheart" and "Muneca".
Id. at 1208 (citations omitted). To successfully establish a hostile work environment, a plaintiff
must show that he or she was "forced to endure a subjectively and objectively abusive working
environment." Id.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
See id.
See supra note 109.
Rene II, 305 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1067.

116.

256 F.3d 864 (9thCir. 2001).
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discrimination. 117
The first Ninth Circuit Rene panel affirmed the judgment of the
district court. 1 8 It relied on Oncale to find that the Supreme Court
required all Title VII plaintiffs to "prove that the conduct at issue was
not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually
constituted 'discrimina[tion]... because of... sex."'' 9 The court then
analyzed the three advisory methods given in Oncale by which a
plaintiff could demonstrate "because of sex" discrimination and
ultimately concluded that Rene stated an actionable Title VII
violation.120

The dissent observed that the majority glossed over the striking
similarities between the petitioners in Oncale and Rene.121 The court
hurried past the facts in order to analyze the three advisory methods in
Oncale that the Supreme Court offered as examples of methods for
determining "because of sex" discrimination. The majority, however,
treated the three Oncale exemplar tests as if they were the only
122
dispositive methods to show "because of sex" discrimination.
Meanwhile, the Oncale court did not even address the specific validity
of the petitioner's Title VII claim, but instead overruled the Fifth
Circuit's refusal
to extend Title VII to any claim of same-sex
23
harassment.

117. Seeid.at875.
118. Rene 1,243 F.3d. at 1210.
119. Id. at 1208 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1997)).
120. The first method is to show the harasser is sexually drawn to the complainant, presumed
when both harasser and victim are homosexual. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. The second route is to
show the harasser used sex-specific and derogatory terms that evidence "general hostility to the
presence of [such person] in work place."
Id. Finally, the complainant may "offer direct
comparative evidence" showing the harasser treated members of the opposite sex differently. Id.;
Rene 1, 243 F.3d at 1208-09. The court first determined that Rene could not show that he was a
victim of his harasser's sexual desire, because he provided no evidence that the offenders were
homosexual, rather his evidence suggested that the offenders merely intended to humiliate him.
Rene 1, 243 F.3d at 1208-09. Secondly, Rene failed to present evidence that the offenders were
motivated by general hostility to the presence of Rene's gender in the workplace, not surprisingly,
because of all of the offenders were also male. See id. at 1209. Thirdly, the court observed that
Rene could not provide comparative evidence that the offenders treated female coworkers
differently than male coworkers, again, not surprisingly, because all of the workers on the twentyninth floor were male. See id.
121. Oncale was forcibly made to submit to constant sex-related physical abuse by his male
coworkers at the Sundowner drill site, Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77, while Rene suffered very similar
indignities from his all male coworkers. See Rene 1, 243 F.3d at 1211 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
122. See Rene 1,243 F.3d at 1211 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
123. See Oncale, 523 U.S at 82. The Supreme Court remanded to the Fifth Circuit for a
determination of "because of sex" discrimination consistent with its opinion that same-sex
harassment is actionable under Title VII. See id.
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Oncale and Rene are virtually indistinguishable, but for one key
difference: Rene was an openly gay man, 24 while the question of
Oncale's sexuality was conspicuously omitted from the court's opinion
or either party's brief. To hold that Oncale has a claim for relief under
Title VII while Rene does not is to say that a gay man may not recover
for the identical same-sex harassment suffered by his heterosexual
counterpart. This is wholly illogical. Rene was denied recovery, whereas
Oncale was granted relief, solely because he was admittedly gay.
While the courts insist that Title VII does not extend to claims
based solely on discrimination because of sexual orientation, 12 never
has a court held that a valid claim of same-sex harassment in violation of
Title VII would not be actionable for a gay man suffering nearly
indistinguishable atrocities by his coworkers. The Rene majority
claimed to be sensitive to the tremendous physical and mental anguish
that Rene was forced to suffer as a result of his coworkers' deplorable
actions.1 26 Yet, the court manipulated Oncale to deny Rene the same
protection he would have had were he a straight man, and this made his
oppressors essentially "immune from legal recourse."1 27 As a result of
this conclusion, the court, in a rare action, ordered an en banc rehearing
of the case.128 Nonetheless, Rene II did not clarify the confusion
underlying the original decision.
The subsequent en banc rehearing reversed the first panel's prior
decision and found that Rene had a valid Title VII claim, 29 however, it
once again reached a decision not supported by precedent. This time,
the Ninth Circuit ruled that Rene's sexual orientation was irrelevant
because sexual orientation is also irrelevant for a woman. 30 In other
words, the court concluded that because Rene's homosexuality did not
defeat his Title VII claim, he properly provided sufficient evidence of a
hostile work environment.' 3' The court based its new rule on a different
interpretation of Oncale, claiming that decision clearly prohibited
"offensive sexual touching."' 132 This reading of Oncale is not based on

124. Renel,243 F.3dat1211.
125. See Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003);
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v. Pizza
Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996), abrogatedby Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
126. Rene 1,243 F.3d at 1210.
127. Id. at 1212.
128. Rene 11, 305 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002).
129. See id.
130.

See id.

131. See id. at 1066.
132. See id. at 1077.
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any language existing in the Supreme Court's opinion; Oncale merely
addressed the cognizability of a Title VII claim of same-sex
harassment. 33 The Supreme Court left to the lower courts the
responsibility to determine whether the discrimination was "because of
sex."' 13 4 The Rene H court seems to imagine Oncale as an addition to the
Meritor and Price Waterhouse cases, which refined the interpretation of
"because of sex,', 135 when instead the Oncale court merely overruled the
overbroad rule of the Fifth Circuit that no claim of sexual orientation
discrimination was valid under
Title VII, but purposely avoided a
136
discussion of "because of sex."

Although the decision of the en banc court allowed Rene to recover
for the outrageous physical abuse and anguish that he suffered, 137 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not improve its understanding of
what type of discrimination is "because of sex." Furthermore, although
the majority did not rely on gender stereotyping in its decision, the court
38
seemed unclear whether gender stereotyping was actually involved.
Regardless of whether Rene suffered discrimination because of his
sexuality or because he may not have conformed to the offender's idea
of the typical male, his offenders clearly committed gender stereotyping
39
in violation of Price Waterhouse doctrine.1
The next case we will examine from the Ninth Circuit, Nichols v.
Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 40 demonstrates that the court
continues to struggle to identify the line between gender stereotyping
and sexual orientation discrimination. Nichols presented the Ninth
Circuit with a case of ongoing abuse, similar to that of Medina Rene,

133. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-82 (1996).
134. See id. at 81-82.
135. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 257-58 (1989) (extending discrimination
because of sex to incidents where a person is discriminated against due to either one's failure to
conform, or conformity with a gender stereotype of how a person of a certain gender should act),
supersededby statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized
in Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994); Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (recognizing that discrimination is because of sex when male superiors create a
hostile work environment because of the subordinate's gender that affects her physically or
psychologically).
136. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78-82.
137. Rene 11,
305 F.3d at 1068.
138. See id. at 1068 (Pregnerson, J., et al., concurring) (arguing that because the evidence
showed that the offenders treated Rene like a woman, there was sufficient evidence of gender
stereotyping.); id. at 1077 (Hug, Jr., J., dissenting) (claiming that the same evidence examined by
the concurrence provides no evidence of gender stereotyping).
139. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242, 258.
140. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
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however, the complainant this time was not openly gay. 141 During the
four years in which Antonio Sanchez worked for Azteca Restaurant
Enterprises, his coworkers constantly victimized him with verbal abuse
because of his effeminate traits. 142 The remarks were not isolated
incidents over his tenure at the restaurant, rather, they were indicative of
his general experience week in and week out. 143 After making repeated

complaints to the human resources director, Arnie Serna, that he
continued to suffer higher degrees of abuse over time, Azteca told
Sanchez that if he had any further complaints he should report the
incidents to the general manager and that routine spot checks would be
conducted.' 44 This proposal had no visible effect upon Sanchez's
working situation, and following a heated argument with his assistant
manager Sanchez walked off the job site. 145
Relying on Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit held that Sanchez
was a victim of gender stereotyping in violation of Title VII.146 Writing

for the majority, Judge Gould states:
At its essence, the systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a
belief that Sanchez did not act as a man should act. Sanchez was
attacked for walking and carrying his tray "like a woman"-i.e., for
having feminine mannerisms. Sanchez was derided for not having
sexual intercourse with a waitress who was his friend. Sanchez's male
co-workers and one of his supervisors repeatedly reminded Sanchez
that he did not conform to their gender-based stereotypes, referring to
him as "she" and "her." And, the most vulgar name-calling directed at
We conclude that this verbal abuse
Sanchez was cast in female terms.
1 47
was closely linked to gender.
The
"because
The
rationale

141.

had proven an actionable
Court determined that Sanchez
48
1
VII.
Title
under
claim
of sex"
court's holding in Nichols seems wholly at odds with the
in Rene II. Despite Rene's requirement that there must be

ld. at870.

142. Id. Specifically, during his tenure, male coworkers and supervisors referred to Sanchez as
a "she" or "her," mocked the way he walked and carried a serving tray "like a woman," and also
referred to him as "a fucking whore." Id.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 874.

Id.
See id. at 875.
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"physical conduct of a sexual nature,"' 149 Nichols seemingly imposes no
such requirement. Sanchez endured ongoing verbal abuse,150 but did not
suffer any physical abuse as required by the Rene IJ.151 Yet the court
found Sanchez's claim to be an actionable "because of sex" claim,
knowing that his harassers called him "a faggot," a term clearly showing
that they perceived him to be a homosexual. 152 To further complicate
matters, the Rene II made the bold assertion that the sexual orientation of
a victim is plainly irrelevant to Title VII litigation. 153 It would appear
based on an examination of both that this statement is completely false.
The most notable difference in the facts between Rene and Nichols
is that Medina Rene was an openly gay man while Antonio Sanchez was
not. 5 4 The Ninth Circuit seems to take a convoluted approach when
making the distinction between gender stereotyping and sexual
orientation discrimination. It is clear that Rene and Sanchez were both
victims of gender stereotyping under the Price Waterhouse analysis
because both victims were forced to endure ongoing humiliation and
abuse since their coworkers did not believe their conduct comported
with traditionally accepted notions of masculinity. 115 Yet the final result
after both cases is that a gay man cannot recover under Title VII for
nearly identical suffering of analogous treatment based on gender
stereotypes as his heterosexual
counterpart, unless he is physically
56
assaulted in a sexual manner.
The sexual orientation and gender stereotyping problem in these
two cases could be rectified if the Supreme Court incorporated sexual
orientation into the "because of sex" provision. Had the Supreme Court
established a bright-line rule that "because of sex" applies to sexual
orientation discrimination, then neither the court in Rene or Nichols
would have had to struggle to find a way for the plaintiffs to recover for
egregious behavior committed by their co-workers on alternate grounds.
Instead, the Court could determine that the conduct constitutes a hostile
working environment for the plaintiffs, and that such conduct is based on
either the plaintiffs actual sexual orientation, or perceived sexual
orientation. There is clear sexual orientation discrimination in both

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Rene 11, 305 F.3d at 1064.
See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 870.
See Rene 11,305 F.3d at 1067.
See Nichols, 256 F.3d at 870, 873; Parrish, supra note 88, at 487.
Rene II, 305 F.3d at 1066.
See Parrish, supra note 88, at 487.
See Rene I, 305 F.3d at 1067; Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75.
Parrish, supranote 88, at 487.
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cases and a revision of Title VII would have resulted in simpler and
more equitable results in both Nichols and Rene.
III. MANY STATES HAVE RESPONDED TO TITLE VII WITH OVERLY
BROAD STATUTES

Perhaps wary of the open-endedness of current Title VII
protections, many states have stepped into the arena to better protect
lesbian and gay individuals from sexual orientation discrimination in the
workplace. ' As of 2005, the District of Columbia and eighteen states
prohibited workplace discrimination based on one's sexual
orientation.1 58 This section will explore state decisions that have
expanded beyond the floor protections of Title VII in order to show that
the states have been forced to enact broader, and sometimes equally
problematic legislation, to provide for Title VII's failure to give
necessary protection.
In Goins v. West Group'59 the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
the respondent's claim did not violate the Minnesota Human Right Act's60
("MHRA") prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination.'
Respondent, a transgendered worker biologically born a male, took
female hormones for several years and had been declaring herself a
157. Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle" Discriminationin Employment, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 377, 419 (2003) (exploring the legal basis for employer decisions based on lifestyle
choices or activities outside the workplace).
158. E.g., D.C. CODE § 2-1402.41(1) (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 151B, § 3(6) (2002);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363A.01-08 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 2008); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (2007); see also Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, Quick Facts About
Workplace
Discrimination,
http://www.lambdalegal. org/our-work/publicati ons/factsbackgrounds/quick-facts-about-workplace. html.
159. 635 N.W.2d717 (Minn. 2001).
160. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08(l) (2004). The statute states in pertinent part:
Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair
employment practice for an employer, because of race, color, creed, religion, national
origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, membership or activity
in a local commission, disability, sexual orientation, or age: (1)to refuse to hire or to
maintain a system of employment which unreasonably excludes a person seeking
employment; or (2) to discharge an employee; or (3) to discriminate against a person
with respect to hiring, tenure, compensation, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or
privileges of employment ....
Id. The MHRA is notably broader than the language of Title VII. Unlike Title VII, the statute adds
the exception that discrimination because of one the enumerated reasons is permissible when based
on a bona fide occupational qualification. See id. Furthermore, the statute specifically enumerates
sexual orientation as a basis for unfair employment discrimination, separately from discrimination
because of sex, thus showing the clear intent to differentiate the meaning of sex from the meaning
of sexual orientation. See id.
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female to the public in 1995.16 The suit arose over a dispute regarding
respondent's insistence that she be allowed to use the female public
bathroom, and petitioner's counter-demand that she use a singleon a different floor in the building, or a different
occupancy bathroom
162
building entirely.

Although specifically prohibiting discrimination based on both sex
and sexual orientation, Minnesota has interpreted sexual orientation as
"having or being perceived as having a self-image or identity not
traditionally associated with one's biological maleness or
femaleness. 1 63 Following the language of the MHRA, the court in
Goins interpreted the statute to uphold the exclusionary policy as nonviolative of the state's prohibition on sexual orientation
discrimination.1 64 While the MHRA seeks to be more expansive and
protective of the rights of homosexuals, its separate definitions of sex
and sexual orientation still lead to confusing results. The statute defined
sexual orientation as relating to one having a self-image not in accord
with society's traditional notion of maleness or femaleness. 165 However,
such language overlaps with an understanding of sex as relating to
biological characteristics. Currently, no conclusive answer has ever
been offered to show whether biology is pre-determinative of one's
sexual orientation, and it is unknown whether the two may be
intertwined. 166 The MHRA's definition of sexual orientation is too close
161. Goins v. West Group, 635 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. 2001).
162. See id. at 721. Responding to concerns by female coworkers sharing a bathroom with
someone biologically a male, petitioner's director of human resource brought the matter to the
attention of other human resource personnel and legal counsel before announcing their policy
decision. Id. After respondent was apprised of the policy to enforce, she requested instead that the
other female workers go through educational training to better understand her situation so that she
could continue using the female restroom. Id. Petitioner refused respondent's proposal and
demanded that she follow their rules. Id. She continued to use the female bathroom, leading to
threats of disciplinary action, and ultimately her resignation, in which she alleged that petitioner's
human resource department treated her "in a manner that had caused her undue stress and hostility."
Id.
163. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03(44) (2004). The statute states, in pertinent part:
"Sexual orientation" means having or being perceived as having an emotional,
physical, or sexual attachment to another person without regard to the sex of that person
or having or being perceived as having an orientation for such attachment, or having or
being perceived as having a self-image or identity not traditionally associated with one's
biological maleness or femaleness. "Sexual orientation" does not include a physical or
sexual attachment to children by an adult.
Id.
164. See Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 723.
165. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03(44); see supra note 163.
166. See Lynn D. Wardle, The Biological Causes and Consequences of Homosexual Behavior
and Their Relevance for Family Law Policies, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 997, 999 (2007).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

25

336
Hofstra
LaborHOFSTRA
and Employment
Journal, Vol.LA25,
Iss. 1 [2007], Art.
LABOR Law
& EMPLOYMENT
WJOURNAL
[Vol.12
25:311

to an understanding of sex to be distinct and easily understood, which is
why the respondent's claim in Goins failed. 67 The fact that the
legislature goes to such lengths to define the concept of "sexual
orientation," and what is known colloquially as transgender identity,
contributes to the argument that the simple term "sex" should be
construed broadly enough to include all of these concepts. 68
New Jersey has deviated from the structure of Title VII and enacted
far broader legislation for regarding employment law. 169 One of the
most famous cases to interpret the New Jersey law is Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale. 70 Dale prohibited the Boy Scouts from expelling a
scout solely on the grounds of his homosexuality. 7 ' The Court noted
that the legislature enacted the statute to meet the broad goal of
eradicating discrimination in all its forms from New Jersey, and should
therefore be construed liberally. 172 The decision turned upon the issue of
whether the Boy Scouts fell under the prohibition of discrimination in
"places of public accommodation."' 73 The court decided that because
the Boy Scouts reached out to the entire public and were closely
connected with federal, state, and local government supports, the
organization qualified as a place of public accommodation.1 74 The court
ruled that the Boy Scouts, as a group
of public accommodation, could
175
not ostracize or exclude gay scouts.

Dale incorporates the intent of the New Jersey Law Against AntiDiscrimination more successfully than the federal decisions regarding

167.
168.
169.

See Gains, 635 N.W.2d at 723.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.03(44).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2004). The command of the statute, that an employer

shall not discriminate:
because of the race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, domestic
partnership status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, sex, disability
or atypical hereditary cellular or blood trait of any individual . . . or because of the

refusal to submit to a genetic test or make available the results of a genetic test to an
employer, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge or require to retire...
from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in
compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment ....
Id. at § 10:5-12 (a), is not clarified elsewhere in the statutes. The law does, however, cover samesex harassment or discrimination based on sex stereotypes. Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d
131, 132, 136 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
170. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am. (Dale 1), 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale (Dale I), 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000).
171. Dale 1,734 A.2d at 1230.
172. Id. at 1208.
173. Id.
174. Seeid. atl211-12.
175. Id. at 1219.
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Title VII. The key purposes of Title VII were to better protect the
constitutional rights of citizens in public places and in public
education. 76 While Dale prohibited the Boy Scouts from sexual
orientation discrimination on the grounds that homosexuals were
protected in places of public accommodation,' 77 the Supreme Court has
not afforded the same protection against sexual orientation
discrimination to teachers. Certainly, it cannot be argued that teaching
in a school is not a public activity; regardless of whether the school is
classified as private or public, the teacher is always in the presence of
students, staff, and faculty. It is then unclear why federal legislation as
currently enacted fails to meet its goal of better public protection against
discrimination.
Most states, like Rhode Island, have enacted employment78
discrimination legislation closely following the structure of Title VII. 1
Although not all states have closely followed Title ViI's mold, 179 the
statute is highly influential in guiding state legislators when deciding
what measure of protection they will accord for employment
Although states like Minnesota attempted to
discrimination. 180
successfully incorporate sexual orientation discrimination into their
laws, the best means of protection is not to add sexual orientation as a
separate class, but for courts to redefine the definition of "because of
sex," so that sexual orientation is understood to be implicit within that
phrase.

176. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
177. See Dale 1,734 A.2d at 1230. The case was eventually decided on constitutional free
530 U.S. at 661. The
association and First Amendment grounds by the Supreme Court. Dale 11,
case has led to much controversy, including cases where universities that have policies against
discrimination including discrimination based on sexual orientation, have filed challenges against
the military's use of school facilities for recruiting, charging that such use violates nondiscrimination statutes and a school's First Amendment rights. Adam Liptak, Colleges Can Bar
Army Recruiters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al.
178. For example, Rhode Island courts have noted that the statute "bears a striking
resemblance to Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Gonsalves v. Alpine Country Club, 563 F.
Supp. 1283, 1287 (D.R.I. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 1984). The courts of Rhode Island
apply "the analytical framework developed in federal Title VII cases" to cases brought under the
Rhode Island statute "[b]ecause the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act is nearly identical
in its remedial provision to its federal analog, Title VII[.]" Marley v. UPS, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 119,
128 (D.R.I. 1987).
179. The District of Columbia applies a "generous construction" principle to its District of
Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA). Lively v. Flexible Packaging Ass'n, 830 A.2d 874, 888
(D.C. 2003). Washington's statute, unlike Title VII, is not limited to employment discrimination
and contains a broad statement of the right to be free from discrimination beyond those enumerated
in Title VII. See Galbraith v. Tapco Credit Union, 946 P.2d 1242, 1248 (Wash. 1997).
180. See Marley, 665 F. Supp. at 128; Gonsalves, 563 F. Supp. at 1287.
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IV. SPECIAL PROBLEM OF PROTECTING TEACHERS IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION

The public education arena presents a pressing need for extending
protections against sex discrimination to include sexual orientation. The
origins of the school system and its continued development over the last

two hundred years are illustrative of a pattern of development, progress,
and interdependency with the law.

The development of the school

system occurred during the colonial period beginning in 1760 and
extending through 1830 and was heavily influenced by the political

challenges of forming a democracy. 181 Founded on the principle that
every citizen, for the benefit of the republic, has the right to a free and
public education, public education and public schools provide the

opportunity for every student to grow into full participants in the
political process.182 The pioneers of the public school system sought an
environment that would produce a well-rounded, well-educated citizen;
many believed that education was the key to stability and development

of the nation. 183 Ratification of the Constitution occurred during this
period, and although the theme of the day was freedom, liberty, and
democracy, suffrage, and representation were limited to white male
property owners. 84 Early schools, where established, were not free. 85
The patriotic foundations are still at the heart of the American school

system, illustrated at least in small part by a salute to the American flag
acknowledged every weekday morning by millions of school children
across the land, although the social and political landscape has
86
changed. 1
181.

MONROE, supra note 12, at 186.

182.

See

LAWRENCE

A. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN

COMMON

SCHOOL:

AN

HISTORIC

CONCEPTION 55 (1951), cf MONROE, supra note 12, at 295 (suggesting that proponents struggled to
encourage the public to pay for schools). Public schools were opposed by those that viewed such
institutions as a suspicious expansion of government. Id. at 334.
183. MONROE, supranote 12, at 186.
184. Id. at 192. There is no mention in the Constitution of public education. Id. at 194.
Rather, the provisions for schools were made by statutory land grants authorized in 1787. Id. at
196. The idea was that blacks and women would be represented through masters, fathers, and
brothers. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 306-07 (1990); DAVID TYACK, SEEKING COMMON GROUND: PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN A
DIVERSE SOCIETY 89 (2003).

185. MONROE, supranote 12, at 295.
186. The pledge of allegiance has been hotly contested in recent years. See Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 18 (2004) (dismissing because of lack of standing a suit by an
elementary school student's father against Congress, the President, California, the school district
and its superintendent seeking an injunction and invalidation of the pledge ofallegiance's inclusion
of the words "under God," added by Congress in 1954, as a violation of the First Amendment).
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Social change is evident when looking at the social and political
climate of the writers of the Constitution until present day; however, the
founders of the public school system, like the founders of America, had
timeless theories that are still at issue when addressing public school
curriculum today. Some public, or common school, proponents argued
that schools should be the breeding ground of the next generation and
should reflect the morals and values of society. 87 The main tenet of this
argument advocated for the indoctrination of republican values in the
American public, to first, "perpetuat[e] . . . the values and institutions

which constituted the basis of republican society and government," and
second, to provide "the training required to make sound decisions within
the framework of these institutions. 1 88 Politics played itself out in the
classroom. Horace Mann, for example, a leading advocate for public
education, proposed that the "middle ground" between political groups
lay in teaching "those articles in the creed of republicanism, which are
accepted by all, believed in by all, and which form the common basis of
our political faith, shall be taught to all."' 189 The standard curriculum
consisted of the indoctrination of democratic theories and democratic
government institutions; where topics of political conflict were
discussed, the teaching standard was the utmost neutrality.' 90 This view
persisted through the nineteenth century, | 91 and still exists today.
A second contingency thought that schools should not merely be a
breeding ground for republican life but that schools should provide
practical vocational training.192 In this view, the purpose of schools
"was to train, not scholars, statesmen, and philosophers, but 'practical
business men [sic], or intelligent, independent citizens." ' 193 This view of
vocational utility persisted through the early 1900s, as many children
preferred to gain technical skills as opposed to book learning, and still
persists today by leading educational authorities, although the number of
children enrolled in vocational programs has declined. 194 The need for
187.

See CREMIN, supra note 183, at 69.

188. Id. at 71.
189. Id. at 72 (quoting HORACE MANN, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION, TOGETHER WITH THE TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD
118 (Boston, Dutton and Wentworth 1849)).
190. Id.
191. See TYACK, supra note 184, at 101.
192. CREMIN, supra note 183, at 64.
193. See id. (quoting ROBERT RANTOUL, JR., THE INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE, DELIVERED
BEFORE THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INSTRUCTION AT THEIR ANNUAL MEETING, tN 1839, at 21
(Boston, Marsh, Capen, Lyon & Webb 1840)).

194. See TYACK, supra note 184, at 99 (describing a study by Helen Todd in 1909 of children
between fourteen and sixteen, who said they preferred to work rather than attend school); OLIVER S.
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an engaged and enlightened citizenry has not declined, despite the push
for academic standards that supposedly leave no child behind. 95 The
schools, by reflecting the diversity of the workplace that young adults
will encounter, can address the need for enlightened citizenry by
preparing students for the workforce.
Technological preparation has expanded in education; the social
environment, while progressing from inception by the integration of
women and minorities in the educator workforce, needs to further match
the facilities' improvement by incorporating openly gay teachers as part
of today's modern society. Educational instruction has expanded from
the sparse and mean existence of the one room school house to the fullfeatured educational facilities in existence today.
Early schools
consisted as single rooms with poor temperature control. 196 In the early
days after the American Revolution, children memorized material from
primers and the Bible, and classroom management systems consisted of
the rod. 197 In contrast, American schools have now evolved to have
fully expounded curriculum, master lesson plans, mentors, staff
development, full administrations, school boards, state committees,
state-propounded curriculum objectives, and fully developed facilities
that can span acres. 198 Education has since evolved from the "one size
fits all" attitude of the past and changed in recognition of the fact that
students have different learning modalities and academic abilities, and
that the curriculum should reflect and build on those individualistic

IKENBERRY, AMERICAN EDUCATION FOUNDATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 38 (1974)

(discussing

a

report by the U.S. Department of Education indicating the lack of career preparation by the nation's
secondary students entering the workforce).
195. See generally No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-78 (2001).
196. MONROE, supra note 12, at 340.
197. See id. at 341,348.
198. For example, today's expanded facilities include the Harvey Milk School. First Public
Gay High School to Open in New
York City, CNN, Jul.
29, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/EDUCATlON/07/28/gay.school.ap. Other facilities are built for energyefficiency. See generally, U.S. Dep't. of Ed. Website, http://www.ed.gov (last visited Mar. 19,
2008). "As of 2002, 99 percent [sic] of public schools have access to the Internet. The ratio of
students to computers with Internet access in public schools is approximately 4.8 to one." Krista
Kafer, The Heritage Foundation for Policy and Analysis, Frequently Asked Questions about
Education in America, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Education/wm478.cfm#_ftn22. A recent
compilation of school statistics by the Center for Educational Reform reports that there are 94,112
total public schools in the United States. The Center for Educational Reform, K-12 Facts,
http://www.edreform.com/index.cfm?fuseAction=section&pSectionlD=l 5&cSectionlD=97#SCHO
OLS (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). 47,917,774 children are enrolled in public schools; 2,997,748
teachers are employed in public schools. Id. Expenditures for public schooling now range in the
$350-450 billion range, with over $200 billion spent on instructional services. Id. Additionally,
roughly $119 billion is spent on student services and almost $14 billion on food services. Id.
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characteristics.' 99 Since individualism is now the student model, the
teaching model should also reflect that individualism at the head of the
class. The key to this is to represent diversity in all its forms, including
sexual orientation.
V. ANALYSIS OF TITLE VII'S PURPOSE AND APPLICATION, REGARDING
"BECAUSE OF SEX" DISCRIMINATION
Title VII states in the preamble that the purpose of the act is to
"authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to protect
constitutional rights in public facilities and public education . . . to
prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs ... and for other
purposes., 200 Title VII is intended to protect rights in education and
federally funded programs, of which public schools are a part.0 Since
the stated purpose of Title VII is to apply its protections to education and
federally funded institutions, including all the public schools in the
nation, discrimination against teachers has been particularly singled out
by Congress for protection.
Section 701 defines the terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of
sex" as including "but not limited to ... pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions. 2 2
Congress added this section to expressly
overrule the Supreme Court's opinion that "because of sex" did not
implicate pregnancy. 20 3 The "but not limited to" language therefore
implies the incorporation of the Court's holdings in Meritor Savings
Bank and Price Waterhouse.204 If the Supreme Court correctly followed
legislative intent, Congress would not have found the need to insert this
provision. Similarly, although not expressly stated, "because of sex"

199. TYACK supra note 184, at 114.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (emphasis added).
201.

See generally JOHN H. JOHANSEN, ET AL., AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE TASK AND THE

TEACHER 445 (2d ed. 1975) (citing a number of acts that have provided federal money for
education, including the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965).
202. § 2000e(k).
203. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (2000)), overrulingGen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
204. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (holding that discrimination
"because of sex" includes discrimination based on sex stereotyping), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. Usi Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994); Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986)
(holding that discrimination based on sex can be shown by establishing a hostile work environment
of discriminatory harassment based on sex).
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should be implicitly understood to include sexual orientation. 20 5

It is

unclear why Congress has not amended Title VII after countless
decisions by the Supreme Court and the lower courts that frustrate the
bill's purpose to provide and ensure constitutional rights in the public
teaching sector.
As the conflict in the Ninth Circuit shows, the outcomes of the
court are not standardized between what does and does not fall under
"because of sex" in Title VII within the circuits. 20 6 In the Third Circuit,
Title VII does not apply to discrimination because of sexual
orientation.20 7 In the Sixth Circuit, transgender individuals are protected
under Title VII. 20 8

In the Second Circuit, sexual orientation is not

20 9
actionable unless the individual is targeted because of sex stereotypes.
In the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits, discrimination based in any
part upon sexual orientation is not actionable.2 10
The circuits' proffered rules for determination of "because of sex"
in Title VII have not been uniform between each circuit. 21I For instance,
the Third Circuit requires that for a homosexual plaintiff to recover for a
"because of sex" violation, the harassment must have as its basis same
sex attraction to the victim, or the harassment must qualify as a result of

205. If Lawrence v. Texas is understood to be decided on due process grounds, rather than
equal protection as the concurrence contends, then the Supreme Court appears to recognize that
homosexual individuals have a fundamental due process right to engage in homosexual acts in
peace, so long as the acts are kept private and do not disturb others. To omit the protection of sexual
orientation discrimination from Title VII seems inconsistent with Lawrence 's extension of due
process.
206. See supraPart I B.
207. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (2001).
208. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 2004). Another possible argument
under Title VII would be to expand the "gender-identity" issue from transgender individuals to
other transgender variants, including "butch" lesbians and "queenie" gay men that do not fit into the
stereotypical male/female gender roles, and thereby falling under the sex stereotyping protections of
Price Waterhouse. This might have some success, at least in the Sixth Circuit.
209. Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). In this case, the court recognized
the discriminatory nature of the plaintiffs claim, but refused to acknowledge its merit based 1) on
poor pleading and 2) on the fact that Congress has not amended Title VII to include sexual
orientation in spite of judicial decisions determining sexual orientation is not covered under Title
VII. Id. However, little is to be inferred from Congressional silence, given the sparse legislative
history of Title VII and the sheer difficulty of defining "sex" discrimination and distinguishing it
from sexual orientation, as outlined in this paper.
210. See Hamem v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003);
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v. Pizza
Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) abrogated by Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
211. See supra Part IIB.
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the type of gender stereotypes announced in Price Waterhouse.212 While
the Sixth Circuit has established a similar requirement that gender
stereotyping is clearly a violation because such conduct would not occur
but for the sex of the worker, its interpretation lacks the Third Circuit's
requirement that a213same-sex harasser be motivated by sexual desire
towards the victim.
The Ninth Circuit's inconsistencies have been obvious without
comparisons to other circuits. Rene I decision denied a homosexual man
the right to recover for actionable same-sex harassment because that
person was homosexual, holding that sexual orientation discrimination is
insufficient to bring a claim under Title VII. 214 Rene II cured one
inconsistency21 5 but was still unsupported by precedent.21 6 Furthermore,
the en banc requirement of physical sexual abuse was a complete
departure from the judgment of the Court of Appeals just one year prior
in Nichols, in which the court announced that a plaintiff stated an
actionable Title VII claim when suffering ongoing and persistent verbal
abuse from his coworkers based on gender stereotypes.2
The Second Circuit's rejection of a homosexual man's right to
suffer from outrageous verbal abuse is both shocking and inconsistent
with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Nichols. In Simonton the plaintiff
was subject to pervasive and consistent verbal comments of a sexual
nature from his co-workers because of his sexual orientation. 218 There
can be little doubt that the abuse suffered by Simonton would be
sufficient to show a hostile work environment under Title VII.219

212.
213.
214.
215.

See Bibby, 260 F.3d at 261.
See Smith, 378 F.3d at 572; Bibby, 260 F.3d at 264.
See Rene II, 305 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2002).
The en banc rehearing was more consistent with the Sixth and Third Circuits regarding its

new rule, that any plaintiff suffering same-sex harassment that was severe enough to constitute a
hostile-work environment claim could validly state a Title VII claim upon which he could recover,

regardless of his or her homosexuality. See id. at 1066. The rehearing did correct the error made
when the initial panel of the Ninth Circuit implied that a homosexual man could never state a Title
VII cause of action, see Rene 1, 243 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001), a notion that has never been
explicitly stated in the Title VII jurisprudence.
216. In order to cure the taint of the first decision, the en banc panel based its decision on
Oncale's prohibition against "offensive sexual touching," although Oncale never created any such
rule. Rene 1I, 305 F.3d at 1067; see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 75-82
(1988).
217. See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001).

218. See Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).
219. In order to show a hostile work environment, the conduct suffered by the victim must be
"pervasive enough 'to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,
24 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). The Supreme Court requires that the victim actually subjectively
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However, the court threw out all three of his theories for which he had a
claim for relief under Title VII. 22 Most disturbing is the court's
assertion that the harasser's conduct may have been the same for both
males and females at the job site, based on his failure to present
comparative evidence of how other male coworkers were treated 2 '
This is plainly an attempt by the court to circumvent facts that show a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination and harassment sufficient
to create a hostile work environment. The plaintiff was clearly singled
out because of his homosexuality; women at any job would never expect
to be the recipient of the type of conduct of which Simonton was a
victim. While women might be sexually harassed, they would not likely
be referred to as a "fucking faggot" or one suffering from "bung hole
disorder. 2 22 The Second Circuit, therefore, leaves open the possibility
of a successful suit for sexual orientation discrimination if the case is
properly pleaded, although the court may again recite the lack of
Supreme Court case law to decide for the plaintiff.
The failure of the Supreme Court to enforce a meaningful guideline
for "because of sex" discrimination has forced the lower courts to act
based upon their own subjective values and biases. While the Ninth
Circuit grants homosexuals the same right to recover under Title VII
when the claim is analogous to one that could be asserted by a
heterosexual, the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits would deny a
homosexual the right to recover under Title VII completely.22 3 There is
a clear difference in political ideology between the several circuits. The
Ninth Circuit should not be the only Court of Appeals to allow
homosexuals to recover for violation of the basic right to work absent
ridicule, mockery, and assault for the simple reason that it may be a
more liberal-minded court than, for instance, the Seventh Circuit.
The biggest concern for the courts, illustrated by Section II B's
analysis of the Nichols-Rene inconsistency, is that courts have no bright
line rule to distinguish between sexual orientation and gender
perceive the environment to be abusive. Id. at 21. Certainly, it is not an issue in any of the cases
cited in this article whether or not the victim perceived the conduct as subjectively abusive. All are
very extreme incidents of abuse by employers and co-workers.
220.
221.

Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35.
Seeid.at37.

222.

Id.
at 35.

223. See Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1062 (7th Cir. 2003);
Higgins v. New Balance Ath. Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut
of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing that same-sex harassment is only

actionable where harasser is gay), abrogatedby Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75,
79(1998).
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stereotypes. Plaintiffs may recover when they are discriminated against
because of gender stereotypes,224 but there is little difference between a
stereotype based on gender and one based on sexual orientation. A gay
man who likes to wear a dress to work does not exhibit behavior of a
typical male in society, but behavior that is also atypical for an average
gay male as well.
Not all homosexuals conduct themselves in a similar manner.
When a homosexual is discriminated against, the discrimination
manifests because of a perceived difference in typical behavior for a
person of that gender, and as a result of the assumption that the behavior
is abnormal for a homosexual person. This hypothetical is merely the tip
of the iceberg; every single instance of gender stereotyping involving a
homosexual person necessarily implicates sexual orientation
discrimination. The courts are left to make the determination as to the
true cause of the discrimination without any bright line rule; it is only
human nature that judges fall back on experience and bias to make a
decision.
As illustrated by state statutes that attempt to define sexual
orientation, the category is simply too broad to allow for easy definition
and instead find coverage under the umbrella term of "sex" in Title VII.
While the federalist system allows for states to make their own
constitutional protections more liberal than the federal government, in
Title VII the federal government has specifically targeted public
education and the ever expanding category of sex to protect. 225 States
may enact parallel protections in other occupational areas, but such
statutes should be considered unnecessary and redundant under a correct
jurisprudence concerning Title VII.
If the morals and values of society are found in republicanism, and
republicanism encourages free discourse, raising citizens and raising
good business people should not be adversely affected by lesbian, gay,
bisexual, or transgender teachers any more than teaching by mediocre
scholars, philosophers, and businesspeople. Courts have enforced equal
access to schools for gay students; 226 the Fourth Circuit has determined
that retaliation against teachers for pushing for minority inclusion in
224. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251-52 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.102-66, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. Usi Film
Prods., 541 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b).
226. See Boyd County High Sch. Gay Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Boyd County, 258
F. Supp. 2d 667, 691 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Massey v. Banning Unified Sch. Dist., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1094-95 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
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educational programs is contrary to Title VII. 2 27 If such protections are
extended to a diverse student body, these protections must equally
extend to a diverse faculty that is representative of the diversity of
society at large.
Teachers are singularly important to children as role models, but a
role model is not a narrow stereotype. 228 As America has become
liberalized in the forty years since Title VII, America's perception of
homosexuals and the attitude towards homosexual rights have changed
greatly. In 2000, 83% of Americans believed that homosexuals deserved
protection from employment discrimination based upon their sexual
orientation. 229 The most obvious way to protect homosexuals is to
update Title VII's interpretation of "because of sex" discrimination to
include discrimination based upon sexual orientation. Despite efforts in
recent years for an amendment of Title VII, this goal has not yet been
achieved, and perhaps no field suffers more from Title VII's deficiencies
than the field of education.
An expansion of Title VII's protection was a key issue debated
between Democratic Presidential candidates Bill Bradley and Al Gore in
23o In the 2004 Presidential race, incumbent George W. Bush and
2000. 21
Senator John F. Kerry debated gay marriage and the validity of Bush's
proposal to amend the Constitution to define marriage as only between a
man and a woman, or "to write discrimination into the Constitution," the
description offered and firmly railed against by Kerry. 231 These key
debates show that homosexual issues have not receded into the past, but
are on the forefront of current events. The gay rights movement that
began in the 1960s and 1970s continues to gain ground,232 showing that
there is a population of individuals in America who will not subvert to
opinions that homosexuality is a choice, but recognizes distinct
biological characteristics. 233 This recognition is not only limited to
227. See Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2003).

228. Hooker, supra note 4, at 2.
229. See John Leland, Shades of Gay, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 2000, at 46, 48. Compare this finding
with that of a 1977 study which found only 55% of Americans would support protection for sexual
orientation discrimination in the workplace. Id. See also Eisenmenger, supra note 16, at 236.
230. See Chris Bull, Bill Bradley Wants You!, THE ADVOCATE, Oct. 12, 1999, at 26, 31 (arguing that

while Al Gore attempted to extend sexual orientation rights through the promulgation of the Employment
Non-Discrimination Act, Bradley proposed instead that Title VII extend to protect sexual orientation

discrimination).
231. Adam Nagourney & David D. Kirkpatrick, The 2004 Campaign: Same-Sex Marriage;
Urged by Right, Bush Takes on Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2004, at A-I.

232. See

DAVID CARTER, STONEWALL: THE RIOTS THAT SPARKED THE GAY REVOLUTION

passim (St. Martin's Press 2004).
233. Wardle, supra note 166, at 999.
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lesbian and gay individuals, but to straight allies and politicians who
must contend with this growing demographic and constituency. 4 In the
2004 election, although many states passed constitutional amendments
barring gay marriage or defining marriage as between a man and a
woman, the issue became a part of national discussion. 35 In many
cases, the states that passed such amendments also provide expanded
protections against workplace discrimination and increased benefits for
domestic partnerships.236
Teaching is one of the most important jobs in America, requiring
the care, responsibility, and education of children, and this significance
makes extending gay rights into this arena particularly controversial.
Several concerns are repeatedly voiced by those who disagree with the
employment of homosexual teachers, such as the idea that
homosexuality will be taught in the classroom, that the presence of
homosexual teachers as teachers and role models to the students might
turn them queer, or that students may be in danger of attack by
homosexual teachers.237 These fears may prevent the hiring or retention
of many qualified teachers. 238 The reality is that students are at greater
risk of attack by apparently straight parents, family members, and other
community leaders. 239 These fears can prevent the hiring and retention
of qualified teachers, doing a greater disservice than a service to
students, particularly during times of educator shortages. 24' During
234. See Gary J. Gates, Gay Demographics Could Reshape Electoral Landscape, USA TODAY,
Nov. 15, 2007, at A-1.
235.

Voters Approve Gay Marriage Bans, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 3, 2004, at 17.

236. See, e.g., Mark Niquette, Law an Obstacle for Gay Workers: Marriage Ban Limits Rights,
Governor Says, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 18, 2007, at B-3; Domestic Partners Bill Approved,
LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 3, 2007, at 16; Michigan Governor Forbids Sexual Discrimination,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 24, 2003, at 2B.
237. See Robert N. Rowe, Homosexual Teachers in the Classroom: The Debate Continues, 79
CLEARING HOUSE: J. OF EDUC. STRATEGIES, ISSUES & IDEAS 207, 207 (2006).
238. See id. Research has also shown that sexual orientation of children is determined either at
birth or very early in a child's development, long before he reaches school. See Women's Ctr., S.
Conn.
State
Univ.,
Homophobia:
Fighting
the
Myths,
http://www.southemct.edu/womenscenter/homophobia/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
239. Studies have shown the theory that homosexuals are more likely than heterosexuals to be
pedophiles and child molesters to be a myth. See A. NICHOLAS GROTH, MEN WHO RAPE 148-49
(1979) (citing that heterosexual adults are more likely to be a threat to children than homosexual
adults); see also DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA passim (1986) (arguing that 95% of

women participating in a study in San Francisco who had experienced sexual abuse had experienced
that abuse from a male family member rather than from a stranger).
240. During World War II, there was an extreme teacher shortage in the United States, and
many teachers held emergency certificates. JOHANSEN, supra note 201, at 28. Based on Ms.

Hatami's personal experience, high demand for teachers similarly existed in Texas circa 2000,
where many teachers received probationary and emergency certificates via alternative educator
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shortages, and to a lesser extent during times of regular market supply
and demand, the imperative of getting certified, qualified, and talented
teachers in the classroom is difficult. 241 The No Child Left Behind Act
is an example of the government's emphasis on the employment of
exemplary teachers; 242 if gay, lesbian, and bisexual teachers are excluded
from this workforce, then students become the true victims of such
discrimination, suffering injury to their educational potential when
taught by lesser qualified individuals who may have their jobs solely
because they fit the heterosexual "norm."
A homosexual teacher is not by definition an unskilled teacher,
rather, his or her sexuality has no bearing upon the ability to teach. The
knowledge that a person is homosexual confuses morality or lifestyle
with skill level.243 Lesbian and gay teachers are just as competent as
their heterosexual counterparts but cannot be expected to perform as
highly without adequate employment protection because of constant fear
that they will be mocked, insulted, and emotionally attacked because of
their sexuality without a means to seek recourse.
The curriculum of public schools has changed over the decades,
evolving to meet the social and political needs of the day and is now a
more fluid, individually tailored endeavor.244 The curriculum of early
schools was heavily indoctrinated with Christian values. However, there
were a number of reformers who sought to change this indoctrination,
arguing that the rights of the individual were being subordinated by
common education. 245 Additionally, democracy was not as we know it
today, but instead was wrought with the inequities of a colonial
aristocracy. 246 As American democracy developed, so did the American

preparation programs.
241.

Michael J. Pitrelli, Assoc. Deputy Under-Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Speech at Southwest

Regional Summit on Teacher Quality: Meeting the Highly Qualified Teachers Challenge (Apr. 4,
2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/2003/04/04082003.html.
242. See id.
243. Transcript: Gregory Koukl, Confusing Skills and Morals, Stand to Reason, Feb. 27,
1995, available at http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&amp;id=5184.
244. See, e.g., The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (requiring

Individualized Education Plans and vocational transition plans for learning disabled students).
245.

See CREMIN, supra note 82, at 69. See also LESTER A. KIRKENDALL ET AL., GOALS FOR

AMERICAN EDUCATION, WRITTEN FOR THE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION OF

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS 8 (1948) ("This concept of democracy closely parallels

the teachings of Christianity in its emphasis upon moral stamina and personal integrity. These traits
of character are essential to effective democratic social organization. Since democracy implies a
society concerned with the worth of each individual as a personality, those things which do violence
to the personality of individuals are undemocratic.").
246. See MONROE, supra note 12, at 192-93.
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school, through the New Deal Era, the Civil Rights movement, and the
Gay Rights movements. Women took their place in the public schools
from the early 1900s forward, 247 but schools have always reflected the
24
conflict over society and the role of gender in society. 48 Viewing sexual
orientation discrimination as a kind of sexism, we should no longer
attempt to isolate and alienate gay students and prohibit gay teachers.
At any point in social history, there exists the view that certain
moral standards are slowly eroding and that changes need to occur, but
that is not caused by progressive social attitudes of schools or positive
reinforcement of civic virtue. 24 9 Rather, it is in response to social
difficulties and the situations of at-risk youths that schools expand social
Studies have shown that gay youths
welfare and inclusion programs.
are the statistical leaders in successful suicides; 25 1 one of the social
difficulties that schools need to respond to is the discriminatory
environment in the student body towards homosexuals, in order to
If teachers reflected the relevant student
decrease this statistic.
population, providing guidance and positive role models as opposed to
remaining in the closet, this statistic might decline.252
247. TYACK, supra note 184, at 90. The issue of race in schools and the place of African
Americans has been fought out in schools since the Civil War era, with slow, incremental change as
the purpose and methods of teaching have changed. Id. However, as a society, we no longer
consider interracial marriage taboo, or isolate black from white students. In fact, schools now strive
for diversity in the student body and in faculty. Id.
248. See id. at 91.
249. See KIRKENDALL ET AL., supra note 245, at 6. At the time, the AFT recognized seven
goals for American Education. "I. The schools must help close the gap between scientific advance
and social retardation." Id. at 9. "2. The schools must prepare individuals to create and live
effectively in a cooperative, independent society." Id. at 10. "3. The school must extend the
interest and concern of people in international cooperation and the maintenance of ajust and durable
peace." Id. at 13. "4. The schools must help in securing acceptance of the ideals of a democracy in
social, economic, and political arrangements." Id. at 14. "5. The schools must develop values that
will serve to guide the individual toward high standards of moral conduct and ethical living." Id. at
15. "6. The schools must provide for the development of creative abilities and afford avenues for
expression in constructive activities." Id. at 16. "7. The schools must insure the mastery of the
common integrating knowledge and skills necessary to effective daily living." Id. at 18. Of course,
these goals were promulgated during a time when most of the nation was segregated and schools
had little to no diversity, and hatred against Japanese-Americans was high. Id. at 4.
250. TYACK,supra note 184, at 109.
251. See Micki Archuleta, Suicide Statistics for Lesbian and Gay Youth: A Bibliography,
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=viewall&address=105x754917 (last visited Mar. 19, 2008). Contra Peter LaBarbera, the Gay Youth
Suicide Myth, http://www.leaderu.com/jhs/labarbera.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2008).
252. It is not unusual to see lesbian and gay celebrities or individuals on television (e.g., Ellen
Degeneres, MTV's The Real World). However, such chimerical personalities continue to be out of
reach for today's youth, who need a recognition of their worth and value from people they respect
and know, namely, teachers.
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The category of "sex" protection in Title VII has always been
understood to include gender.253 It has been expanded to include
discrimination on sex stereotypes and against transgender individuals.254
Because one of the key purposes of Title VII is to protect individuals
from discrimination in schools, the expansion of the term "sex" should
occur first in the public school setting, where teachers and administrators
of public schools help to indoctrinate the next generation with the ideals
of democracy, civil rights, equal protection under the law, and freedom
from discrimination.
Once the "because of sex" protection is interpreted to include
sexual orientation and other gender disparities, the door to the Title VII
proof structure opens for plaintiffs. Possibly useful for victims of sexual
discrimination in hiring practices is the disparate impact of a pattern and
practice of discrimination in hiring, promotion, and other employment
activities by educational institutions against gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
even transgender teachers. The sheer amount of labels assigned to this
group, however, makes the assessment of the relevant percentage of the
population that reflects these characteristics difficult, and therefore
almost impossible to compare to the workforce. Also problematic are
the variations of self-identification among this multi-faceted population.
The leading case in this area is Hazelwood School District v. United
States. 5 In Hazelwood, the government created a pattern and practice
offense, alleging that the school district had a history of "racially
discriminatory practices," "statistical disparities in hiring," hiring
practices that were mostly subjective, and "specific instances of alleged
discrimination against fifty-five unsuccessful "Negro" applicants for
teaching jobs., 256 The key conflict in Hazelwood was the differing
analysis of the statistical evidence that the District Court and Appellate
Court offered.257 The District Court, examining the relatively small
number of "Negro" teachers, determined that population to be a
sufficient reflection of the percentage of "Negro" students within the
school district. 258 The Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit reversed
the lower court decision, analyzing the statistical data by examining the
small percentage of teachers employed in Hazelwood to the percentage

253.
254.
255.
256.

Seesupra Partl
See supra Part 1-11.
433 U.S. 299 (1977).
Id.at 303.

257. Id. at 304-05.
258. Id. at 304.
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of "Negro teachers in the relevant labor market. 259
There is difficulty finding an appropriate procedure to determine
the percentage of teachers in a particular school district that identify
themselves with a specific segment of the sexual orientation spectrum
that are employed in a certain school district. Given the current state of
the law, teachers will often not self-identify because there is little legal
protection for the property interest in their jobs if they identify as
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. 260 Additionally, there is difficulty
determining the percentage of similarly situated teachers in the relevant
labor market. Again, this would require self-identification in the census
data, which is flawed at best: for example, the 2000 Census, while
identifying the occupation and geographic location of individuals,
identified them only by the characteristics of "gender, race, ethnicity,
education, age, industry and earnings.' 26' Since the Census does not
account for sexual orientation in its data gathering, other methods of
statistical research would need to be employed, leading to fluctuations in
statistical data given the varying reliability of other data collection tools.
There is also something to be said for the District Court's analysis
in Hazelwood that the teaching population should reflect the student
population of the school or school district. 262 But this has less to do with

the disparate impact on employment discrimination than the necessary
If public schools are to provide a
function of public schools.

259. Id. at 305. Of course, determining the relative labor market is a task in and of itself. The
Court of Appeals determined that the relevant labor market was St. Louis County and St. Louis
City. Id. However, the Supreme Court determined that the relevant labor market involved a five
part factor test:
(i) whether the racially based hiring policies of the St. Louis City School District were in
effect as far back as 1970, the year in which the census figures were taken; (ii) to what
extent those policies have changed the racial composition of that district's teaching staff
from what it would otherwise have been; (iii) to what extent St. Louis' recruitment
policies have diverted to the city, teachers who might otherwise have applied to
Hazelwood; (iv) to what extent Negro teachers employed by the city would prefer
employment in other districts such as Hazelwood; and (v) what the experience in other
school districts in St. Louis County indicates about the validity of excluding the City
School District from the relevant labor market.
Id. at 311-12. Determining the relevant labor market according to this factor test adds to the
complications of determining whether there has been disparate impact on the basis of sex or sexual
orientation, and will not be explored here; rather, the argument assumes that the relevant labor
market of qualified teachers is pre-determined. In any case, of course, the relevant labor market
would be hotly contested.
260. See supra Parts I-Il.
261. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce (Dec. 29, 2003) (on
file with author).
262. Hazelivood, 433 U.S. at 304.
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representative illustration of society so that they may better achieve the
ancient goals of indoctrination of democratic values, including liberty,
freedom, and equality, then it is imperative that faculty are
representative of the student body.
CONCLUSION

The category of "sex" discrimination in Title VII should be
expanded to include sexual orientation. In the past, sex discrimination
has been found where individuals, either women or men, have been
discriminated against because they do not meet the perceived social
norms or stereotypes for their gender. Likewise, when lesbian and gay
individuals are discriminated against, it is because they do not meet the
perceived social norms for behavior, personality, dress, and personal and
sexual relationships. Discrimination against men because they sleep
with men, instead of women, treats men in a different way than women,
manifesting the dominant heterosexual sex stereotype that only women
are allowed to sleep with men. This stereotype is further propounded
when discrimination is allowed to pass unchallenged.
Giving teachers the safety and protection that should be accorded
under Title VII begins with a judicial reinterpretation of "because of
sex." Although other Supreme Court decisions have willingly expanded
the scope of this language to cover such abstract and indeterminate ideas
as gender stereotyping, 263 the Supreme Court has still denied sexual
orientation discrimination the protection that it deserves in order to
ensure the fundamental rights of America's teachers. As a result, the
Courts of Appeals have been left to their own discretion to fill-in the
blanks, so to speak, and determine appropriate policy for grey areas,
including cases involving transgendered individuals or conduct that is
clearly discriminatory because of sexual orientation, but has an unclear
overlap with gender stereotypes. This has led to the particularly
conflicting results in the Ninth Circuit in Nichols and both Rene I and en
banc Rene IT Given the change in the social climate over the past forty
years, in conjunction with the public policy that is furthered by enforcing
the stated purpose of Title VII to include within its scope public
education and thereby protect all teachers in public schools, which
protection promotes better role-models and a safer learning environment

263. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 255 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. Usi
Film Prods., 541 U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
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as a result, the Supreme Court has no reason to rigidly insist that
"because of sex" does not implicate sexual orientation. A bright-line
rule prohibiting sexual orientation is both sensible for judicial
application, and absolutely essential to the sanctity of public education
institutions.
The goal of schools is to indoctrinate the next generation of citizens
with republican values and maintain the status quo, or in other words,
perceived social norms. In order to do this, schools seek to hire teachers
who have high-quality character and traits that make them a desirable
role model. If the school's goal is to indoctrinate the next generation
with the dominant "norm" of the day, then schools may be able to
attempt to erect a bona fide occupational quality defense to a sex
discrimination claim, saying that it is essential to the character of the
business that as role models, teachers need to have normative
heterosexual relationships and marriages. However, the social and
political climate in America is such that this "norm" is not absolutely
clear, and the issue of whether homosexuals have certain fundamental
rights or whether their relationships should be recognized is subject to
national political discussion, such that courts would have no clear
guidance whether or not to recognize a bona fide occupational
qualification defense.
Another pertinent argument reasons that teachers, as role models,
should accurately reflect the population they serve. Often, students who
do not identify with the status quo are bereft of positive role models such
as "out" teachers, since teachers often fear losing their jobs. Such
students are more prone to suicide and other destructive behaviors, and
are less likely to become productive members of society. 26 If the goal is
to produce well-rounded citizens, then curbing this tendency towards
destructive behaviors should be a part of the underlying school policy.
Therefore, students should have the opportunity to utilize many
resources at school, including teachers that reflect the diverse
characteristics of all members of the student body.
Although the court in Hazelwood declined to use the relevant
student population to determine the proportion of faculty in a school
district should reflect different races, it did require schools to pull from
the relevant qualified labor market.265 It is highly likely that looking at
such a pool, there would be a number of gay or lesbian teachers. Hiring
policies should create faculty that reflect this population, and receive
264. See sources cited supra note 251.
265. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 313 (1989).
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protection in their working environment from Title VII, given the
explicit mention of the application of Title VII to public education in its
preamble. Teachers from all walks of life and sexual preferences are
currently teaching in our schools; it is time to give them recognition for
the job they perform and take them out of the dark shadow of fearing job
loss because of sexuality. As always, the United States government
needs to play "catch-up" with a number of states and foreign
jurisdictions.
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